Sequential attack detection in a distributed estimation system is considered, where each sensor successively produces one-bit quantized samples of a desired deterministic scalar parameter corrupted by additive noise. The unknown parameters in the pre-attack and post-attack models, namely the desired parameter to be estimated and the injected malicious data at the attacked sensors pose a significant challenge for designing a computationally efficient scheme for each sensor to detect the occurrence of attacks by only using local communication with neighboring sensors. The generalized Cumulative Sum (GCUSUM) algorithm is considered, which replaces the unknown parameters with their maximum likelihood estimates in the CUSUM test statistic. For the problem under consideration, a sufficient condition is provided under which the expected false alarm period of the GCUSUM can be guaranteed to be larger than any given value. Next, we consider the distributed implementation of the GCUSUM. We first propose an alternative test statistic which is asymptotically equivalent to that of GCUSUM. Then based on the proposed alternative test statistic and running consensus algorithms, we propose a distributed approximate GCUSUM algorithm which significantly reduce the prohibitively high computational complexity of the centralized GCUSUM. Numerical results show that the approximate GCUSUM algorithm can provide a performance that is comparable to the centralized GCUSUM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Applications of sensor networks for parameter estimation, ranging from inexpensive commercial systems to complex military and homeland defense surveillance systems, have been extensively studied in recent literature [1] . Typically, large-scale sensor networks consist of low-cost and spatially distributed sensors with limited battery power and low computing capability, which makes the system vulnerable to cyberattacks by adversaries. This has led to great interest in studying the vulnerability of sensor networks in various applications, see [2] - [9] and the references therein.
Recently, one-bit quantization has been increasingly gaining attention in the applications of sensor networks and other systems like massive MIMO communication systems, see [10] - [15] for instance.
The application of one-bit quantization in such systems is partially motivated by the fact that the power consumption of the analog-to-digital (ADC) converters grows exponentially with the number of quantization bits [16] . One-bit ADC consists of a simple comparator which does not require automatic gain control or a highly linear amplifier, and therefore can be implemented with very low cost and power consumption [17] . This paper considers a spatially distributed sensor network estimation system employing one-bit quantization under the assumption that the measurements from a subset of sensors are under the threat of attacks.
There are primarily two types of sensor network architectures, depending on whether or not there exists a fusion center (FC). In the presence of an FC, all sensor data is collected and processed at the FC. Thus, one of major challenges associated with this type of sensor networks arises from the communication burden from sensors to the FC, especially when sensors are widely deployed and far away from the FC.
For the other type of sensor networks without an FC, which are referred to as distributed sensor networks, the sensors are connected to their neighboring sensors, which allow them to exchange data using local short-range communication. In a distributed sensor network, each sensor needs to make its own inference based on its own information and the information received from its neighboring sensors. The information aggregation in distributed sensor networks has been extensively studied. Most of the existing literature focuses on the fixed-sample-size paradigm, where every sensor starts with some samples and aims to obtain the average of all samples in the distributed sensor network through inter-sensor information exchange. The most popular information exchange protocols are the "consensus algorithm" and "gossip algorithm", whose comprehensive surveys can be found in [18] and [19] , respectively. In these works, a new sample is not allowed to enter into the system during the process of inter-sensor information exchange, and hence they are only relevant to the fixed-sample-size inference problems.
In distributed sequential inference problems, with successively arriving samples, the more practical scenario is that the sampling and information aggregation processes take place simultaneously, or at least in comparable time-scales. Under this setup, [20] proposed the "consensus + innovation" approach for distributed recursive parameter estimation; [21] investigated the problem of tracking a stochastic process using a "running consensus" algorithm. The distributed sequential change-point detection based on running consensus algorithms has not been well investigated.
In this paper, we consider the problem of detecting the occurrence of attacks in a distributed sensor network estimation system with quantized data as quickly as possible while the expected false alarm period is under control. The sequential change-point detection, also known as quickest detection, which minimizes the expected detection delay subject to certain performance constraint on the expected false alarm period, suits well to this kind of problems. Various change-point detection methods have been developed based on the well-known Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm [22] , [23] . However, most of the existing approaches either focus on the case where no unknown parameter exists, or require an FC that collects information (raw data or statistics) from all sensors to implement the algorithm, since the test statistic of the CUSUM algorithm accumulates the log-likelihood ratio of each data nonlinearly. Here, we propose a new distributed change-point detection procedure based on running consensus algorithms, which allows each sensor in the network to detect the occurrence of attacks even though there are unknown parameters.
A. Summary of Results
In this work, we consider the sequential attack detection in a distributed sensor network where each sensor successively makes one-bit quantized samples of a desired deterministic scalar parameter corrupted by additive noise. The network is composed of two types of sensors. One type of sensors have a very high level of security and thereby are guaranteed to be tamper-proof. The rest of the sensors are insecure, which are subject to attacks. In practice, the secure sensors can be well protected, built with powerful chips, and thereby highly sophisticated encryption algorithms and security procedures can be implemented. At some time instant, the adversaries may launch attacks at the insecure sensors simultaneously by injecting different malicious data into these sensors. It is well-known that the CUSUM algorithm is minimax optimal if the pre-attack and post-attack statistical models of the observations can be specified [24] .
However, neither pre-attack nor post-attack models can be specified in our considered problem, since there are unknown parameters in both statistical models, namely the desired parameter to be estimated and the injected malicious data. In light of this, we consider a CUSUM-type algorithm based on the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR), called the generalized CUSUM (GCUSUM) algorithm, which replaces the unknown parameters with their maximum likelihood estimates in the CUSUM test statistic.
It is shown that unlike the case where the pre-attack statistical model of the observations can be specified, the secure data also contributes to the test statistic of the GCUSUM due to the uncertainty of the desired parameter in the pre-attack statistical model. In addition, unlike the test statistic of the CUSUM for the case where the pre-attack and post-attack statistical models of the observations can be specified, the test statistic of the GCUSUM cannot be expressed in a recursive form evolving over time, which hinders us from efficiently implementing the GCUSUM.
Moreover, the expected false alarm period may not be controlled for the GCUSUM in general. In order to overcome this, before carrying out the inference task, we secure the system for a period of time during which the whole system is tamper-proof. A sufficient condition on the length of the secure time is provided under which the expected false alarm period of the GCUSUM test can be guaranteed to be larger than any prescribed value. Furthermore, we show that if the length of secure time or the number of sensors in the network are large enough, the false alarm period the GCUSUM test can be guaranteed to be arbitrarily large with arbitrarily high probability.
It is worth mentioning that there are two major difficulties in the implementation of the GCUSUM for the problem under consideration. First, the computation of the test statistic of the GCUSUM requires centralized processing which brings about a significant communication overhead in large-scale spatially distributed sensor networks. Second, even if centralized processing is allowed, the computational complexity of the test statistic of the GCUSUM is prohibitively high. Motivated by these facts, we consider the distributed computation of the test statistic of the GCUSUM. Due to the procedure for estimating the unknown parameters and the mixed-integer programming in the computation of the test statistic of the GCUSUM, it is impossible to implement the GCUSUM based on running consensus algorithms, since the running consensus algorithms essentially can only calculate the weighted sum of local statistics at the sensors. To facilitate the distributed implementation of the GCUSUM, we first propose an alternative test statistic as a substitute for the test statistic of the GCUSUM, which is shown to be asymptotically equivalent to that of the GCUSUM when the secure time is sufficiently long. Similar to the test statistic of the GCUSUM, this alternative test statistic can be written as a sum of statistics which are contributed by the secure and insecure data, respectively.
For the statistics contributed by the secure data, we propose a running consensus algorithm which enables each sensor to produce a local estimate of each statistic. We show that the estimation error can be bounded from above almost surely when the secure time is sufficiently long. Moreover, this upper bound on the estimation error decreases to zero as the number of message-passing steps in the proposed algorithm increases. To compute the statistic contributed by the insecure data in a distributed and computationally efficient way, we first relax the constraint of simultaneous attack and assume that the attack times at different sensors can be different. Then the statistic can be rewritten in a recursive form which can be calculated at each sensor by employing running consensus algorithms.
B. Related Work
Attack detection in sensor networks using quantized data has been widely investigated, see [2] - [9] and the references therein. Most of these works investigate the problem of detecting attacks under the fixedsample-size paradigm, while this paper focuses on the sequential attack detection. Quickest detection in sensor networks has also gained a great deal of attention in recent literature, see [25] - [32] for instance.
However, most of these works require an FC to process all local sensor statistics centrally; while in this work, we consider the sequential attack detection in a distributed sensor network where no FC exists and each sensor needs to make its own decision based on its own data and the received information from its neighboring sensors.
The closest works to this paper are [32] - [35] , which all focus on the consensus based change-point detection in distributed sensor networks. Still, there are major differences. In [34] , [33] and [32] , the authors assume that the pre-change and post-change distributions are completely known; while in this work, none of them are completely specified. In [35] , a geometric moving average algorithm is employed for detecting the change; while in this work, we are primarily interested in CUSUM-type algorithms.
A related but different problem, the distributed sequential hypothesis test based on consensus, has been studied in [36] , [37] , where the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) is employed to resolve two hypotheses, which is different from the change detection problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The problem statement and background are described in Section II. The sequential attack detection based on GCUSUM is introduced in Section III. In Section IV, we propose a distributed approximate GCUSUM algorithm which can be implemented through running consensus algorithm. In Section V, numerical results are provided to illustrate the performance of our proposed approach. Finally, Section VI provides our conclusions.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

A. Problem Statement
We consider a sensor network consisting of N spatially distributed sensors, each sequentially making observations of a deterministic scalar parameter θ corrupted by additive noise. At the k-th time instant, the signal presented to the j-th sensor is described by
where n (k) j denotes the additive noise sample with common cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (·) and {n (k) j } is an independent and identically distributed sequence. We assume that the cdf F (·) is invertible.
Each sensor employs a common one-bit quantizer to covert the analog signal x 
where τ is the threshold of the quantizer. We assume that each sensor can only exchange information with its neighboring sensors, and attempts to produce its estimate of the unknown parameter θ. The intersensor communication links determine the topology of the sensor network, which can be represented by an undirected graph G = {N , E} with N being the set of sensors and E the set of edges.
We assume that there exist a subset S of sensors which are secure, and we use A = N \S to denote the set of insecure sensors. The numbers of sensors in S and A are denoted by N S and N A , respectively. It is worth mentioning that S can be empty. Suppose that after a period of secure time M , some adversaries launch data injection attacks at some time t a > M at insecure sensors, hoping to cause the sensor network system to reach an inaccurate estimate of θ. We consider the worst possible scenario regarding the number of corrupted sensors, and hence, our analysis focuses on the case where the set of all insecure sensors are corrupted [38] . Accordingly, for any j ∈ A, the observations become
where µ j is an unknown deterministic injected data at the j-th sensor which satisfies
The quantity b is a prescribed value, setting the lower bound for the measurement change that draws security attentions. As such, our goal here is to detect the attacks as soon as possible after their occurrence at t a . The quickest detection technique, that exploits the statistical difference before and after the changepoint, provides a suitable framework to achieve this goal. For the sake of notational simplicity, we use {ǔ (m) j } to denote the quantized data in the period of secure time, that is,ǔ
for all j and m = 1, 2, ..., M , and we relabel u
for all j and k ≥ 1.
B. Quickest Detection
In quickest detection, we observe samples sequentially in time, and then stop when a predesigned rule declares a change. Unlike the fixed-sample-size schemes that lay more attention on the detection power, the sequential change detector aims at minimizing the expected detection delay after the change-point.
The commonly used performance measure is the worst-case expected detection delay, proposed by Lorden
where T is a stopping time variable corresponding to a certain detection scheme and F t is the filtration generated by all the observations up to time t. The expectation t is evaluated with respect to the postchange probability measure conditioned on the change-point t and the all observations up to time t. The essential supremum is obtained over F t , yielding the least favorable situation for the expected detection delay. The supremum in (5) is obtained over t, meaning that the change occurs at such a point that the expected detection delay is maximized. To summarize, J(T ) characterizes the expected detection delay for the worst possible history of observations before the change-point. While the small expected detection delay under attack results in timely alarmed reaction, the running length under unattacked data, on the other hand, needs to be guaranteed to avoid frequent false alarms. To this end, the sequential change detection problem is formulated as follows:
Note that the expectation ∞ is evaluated with respect to the probability measure where no change occurs, i.e., t = ∞, and κ is a prescribed constant which specifies the required lower bound on the expected false alarm period. To proceed with our attack detection problem, we denote the probability measures under no attack and under attack as È 0 and È 1 , respectively. If all the parameters θ and {µ j } are known, the quickest detection problem in (6) is optimally solved by the well-known CUSUM test [24] T C = min
where the threshold h is determined by the constraint in (6) . For a given K, the value of k which maximizes the test statistic in (7) can be considered as the estimate of attack time. It is well-known that the nonlinear accumulation of the log-likelihood ratios in (7) can be written in a recursive way, and hence can be easily implemented in practice with low complexity [22] , [23] .
Note that in our attack detection problem, the parameters θ and {µ j } are unknown and need to be estimated, as estimating θ is the essential task of the network. To address this, this paper resort to the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) method by replacing the unknown parameters with their maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) [22] , [23] .
III. SEQUENTIAL ATTACK DETECTION BASED ON GENERALIZED CUSUM TEST
A. Generalized CUSUM Test
Upon replacing the unknown parameters θ and {µ j } with their MLEs, the generalized CUSUM test can be written as
where T G is the stopping time corresponding to the generalized CUSUM test, and the statistic Λ
with
By defining
the statistic Λ
by employing (9), (12) and (13) .
It is worth mentioning that the constraint on {µ j } as illustrated in (4) is crucial in the generalized CUSUM test in (8) , since the pre-attack model will be subsumed in the post-attack model if the constraint in (4) is removed. To be specific, in general, in order to guarantee the detectability of the attacks, the sign of the mean value of the generalized log-likelihood ratio should differ between the pre-attack and post-attack scenarios [22] , [23] . However, if we remove the constraint in (4), we can obtain
by employing (10) and (11) . Thus, no matter whether attacks occur or not, the expected value of the test statistic is always nonnegative, which implies that the attacks are nondetectable.
B. Conditions to Meet Expected False Alarm Period Constraint
Moreover, note that the threshold h in (8) needs to be set to meet the constraint on the expected false alarm period in (6) . However, due to the uncertainty of the pre-attack model and the post-attack model, it
is not clear whether the constraint in (6) can be guaranteed by some h in general. For example, consider the case whereθ
is close to 0, and hence, Λ (k,K) G blows up, which gives rise to T G close to 1 with high probability for any h. In this case, the constraint in (6) may not be guaranteed. In light of this, we first look into this issue.
Notice that by defining
f 0 (θ) in (11) can be rewritten as
which yields
By the definition ofθ 
by employing (16) and (18) . In the following, we provide a theorem regarding the false alarm period.
Theorem 1. With sufficiently large M or N , the false alarm period can be set to be arbitrarily large with any high probability by properly choosing h. In particular,
Proof: By employing (19), we can obtain
Now, we consider the probabilities È 0
where {X i } is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution
and
Since ǫ 2 > 0 (X i ) = 0, by the large deviations theory [40] , we can obtain
where the rate function υ (1) θ is given by
and the function ϕ X (c) is defined as
The quantity c * in (27) is the positive solution to
By employing (22), (24), (25) , (27), (28) and (29), the rate function υ (1) θ can be obtained as
On the other hand, È 0 (S ≤ 1 − q (θ) − ǫ 1 |θ ) can be rewritten as
where {Y i } is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution
Similarly, we can obtain
where the rate function υ (2) θ is given by
From (23), (26) and (34), it is clear that
where υ * θ is defined as
Define
, then by the definition of S in (21), we have
, then by employing (41), we can obtain
which implies that for anyǔ
and therefore, by employing (14), we can obtain
Note that for any given M , N and h, if (44) holds and the stopping criterion in (8) is triggered, then
which implies
In consequence, for any given M , N and h, we have
which yields that for any given θ,
From (47), we know that with sufficiently large M or N , if there is no occurrence of attacks, the stopping time T G in (6) can be set to be arbitrarily large with any high probability by properly choosing h.
Next, we provide another theorem regarding the constraint on the expected false alarm period in (6) .
where υ * θ is defined in (37) , then ∞ {T G } ≥ κ as long as
where ǫ * is defined in (38) .
Since T G is a non-negative random variable, the expected false alarm period can be bounded from below as per
by employing (47) and (50), which completes the proof.
As demonstrated by Theorem 1, in the considered attack detection problem, if the length of secure time M or the number of sensors N is large enough, the false alarm period can be guaranteed to be arbitrarily large with any high probability by choosing a large h. A larger false alarm period is always desirable, hence the system would better maintain secure for a sufficiently large M prior to the inference task. Moreover, Theorem 2 illustrates that in order to guarantee the expected false alarm period to be larger than the prescribed threshold κ in (6), the product of M and N should be larger than the critical quantity ln 2 υ * θ . However, as shown in (27), (35) and (37), this critical quantity depends on θ which is unknown to the system, and therefore, to guarantee the condition in (49), the system should be secured for a sufficiently long time in advance, i.e., M should be sufficiently large. In light of these, in the following, we will be primarily interested in the case where M is sufficiently large.
C. Approximate Maximum Likelihood Estimates
By employing (10), (12) and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [41] ,θ
where f 1 (θ, {µ j }) is defined in (10) . By defining can be analytically expressed as
where q(θ) is defined in (16) . By employing (54)-(57) and (59), we can obtain
whereμ j is defined asμ 
The motivation forθ (a) in (63) is from the fact that in the asymptotic regimes where M → ∞ or K → ∞, from (63), we knowθ 
by the strong law of large numbers. As stated before, we are primarily interested in the scenario where the system is secured for a sufficiently long time at the beginning, i.e., M is sufficiently large, thus the estimateθ (a) converges to the true value of the unknown parameter in the scenario of interest. Moreover, with a sufficiently large number of observations,θ
MLE is also expected to get close to the true value. To this end,θ (a) must be close toθ By employing (62) and (63), the correspondingμ j can be expressed as
and Λ (k,K) G can be rewritten as
whereθ (u) MLE is given by (19) 
It is worth pointing out that the estimatorsθ (a) ,θ
MLE andμ j need to be recalculated for different k or K, which results in a very high computational complexity in obtaining T G in (8) . Moreover, it is seen from (8) that since the test statistic of generalized CUSUM can not be calculated in a recursive way, the computation of the test statistic of the generalized CUSUM requires an exhaustive search over k for each K which is considered as computationally prohibitive in practice, especially when h is large.
To this end, the generalized CUSUM test in (8) is not amenable to implementation in practice even if centralized processing is allowed, which motives us to pursue more practical algorithms in the following.
The test statistic of the generalized CUSUM in (66) deserves some discussion. It is seen from (66) that the first two terms in the sum coming from the secure data which is due to the existence of unknown parameters in both the pre-attack and post-attack models. This implies that in the presence of the unknown parameters in both the pre-attack and post-attack models, the secure data also conveys some information on the attacks, which is not observed in the test statistic of CUSUM in (7) . In addition, if θ is known, then it is clear that the first three terms in (66) varnish, which greatly simplifies the expression of the test statistic in (66). Therefore, the presence of unknown parameters in both the pre-attack and post-attack models renders the attack detection problem more difficult.
IV. CONSENSUS-BASED DISTRIBUTED SEQUENTIAL ATTACK DETECTION
In the previous section, the generalized CUSUM detector is investigated. It is seen from (8), (19) , (61), (63) and (66) that all the quantized sensor data in the network is required to be synchronously collected and processed at each time at a single place which plays the role of the fusion center. This brings about a significant communication overhead in large-scale spatially distributed sensor networks. More importantly, as mentioned before, the generalized CUSUM is computationally prohibitive in practice. In light of this, we proceed to propose a distributed sequential attack detector based on the generalized CUSUM test, which only requires communications between closely positioned sensors and is amenable to implementation in practice. The resulting distributed detector remarkably decreases the long-distance communication overhead and reduces the computational complexity, yet preserves high detection performance.
A. Asymptotically Equivalent Alternative Test Statistic
For each given K, the test statistic max 1≤k≤K Λ (k,K) G of the generalized CUSUM test can be rewritten as
by employing (8) It is worth mentioning that although the term η (3) K,M in (67) is the log-likelihood ratio of the quantized data from A up to time k ≤ K, it is adapted to the filtration F K generated by all quantized data from all sensors up to time K, since k is adapted to the filtration F K . Therefore, the computation of η 
The following theorem describes the relationship between H 
First, we claim that we can switch the orders of the limit operation and the max operation for the first term on the right-hand side in (70). This claim can be proved as follows.
For any two random variables X M and Y M ,
which is a continuous function of X M and Y M , and therefore,
By induction, for any given K < ∞, we know 
By employing the definition of φ (3) ji in (66), we can obtain
Furthermore, notice that for any given K ≤ ∞,
where (77) 
K,M = 0, a.s..
As a result, from (74), we know that for any given K ≤ ∞ K,M consists of three terms, that is, η
K,M and max 1≤k≤K η K,M is contributed by the insecure data. In the following subsections, we will illustrate how to compute these three terms in a distributed way by employing running consensus algorithms, respectively.
B. Local Estimators Based on Running Consensus Algorithms
In this subsection, we consider the distributed computation of certain statistics based on the communication protocol known as the running consensus algorithm, in which the sensors exchange their local statistics instead of the raw samples between every two sampling instants. Moreover, we assume that Q ≥ 1 rounds of message-passings can take place within each sampling interval.
Let us first consider the statistics in η 
where
It is seen from (85) that η 
which is fully determined by λ M , λ N and λ S . Moreover, as shown later, max 1≤k≤K η (4) K,M also depends on the statistics λ M , λ N and λ S . To this end, we consider the distributed computation of λ M , λ N and λ S in the remainder of this subsection.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we first put the quantized data {ǔ
j , if l ≥ M + 1 and j ∈ S, 0, otherwise.
(91)
Based onγ (l) , γ (l) and γ (l) , we can employ running consensus algorithms to obtain three local statistics at each sensor which will be utilized to produce local estimates of λ M , λ N and λ S later. Specifically, leť Γ (l) , Γ (l) and Γ (l) denote three statistic vectors at time l, where the j-th element of each statistic vector denotes a local statistic at the j-th sensor at time l, respectively. We setΓ (0) = Γ (0) = Γ (0) = 0. Within the l-th sampling interval, the running-consensus-algorithm-based computation is carried out as follows:
1) Take a new sample at each sensor at time instant l, and add it to the statistic vectors from previous time as follows:
2) For n = 1, 2, ..., Q, every sensor exchanges its local intermediate statisticsΓ (l,n) , Γ (l,n) and Γ (l,n) with its neighboring sensors, and updates the local intermediate statistics as the weighted sum of the available statistics from the neighboring sensors, i.e., for n = 1, 2, ..., Q and ∀j ∈ N ,
where N j denotes the set of indices of the j-th sensor's neighbors and the weight coefficients {w ij }, {w ij } and { w ij } will be specified later. The notation (·) j in (93)-(95) denotes the j-th element of the corresponding vector.
3) Update the local statistics for time l aš
4) Go to
Step 1) for the next sampling interval l + 1.
From (93)-(95), we can express each message-passing in a compact matrix form aš Γ (l,n) =WΓ (l,n−1) , Γ (l,n) = WΓ (l,n−1) and Γ (l,n) = W Γ (l,n−1) , for n = 1, 2, .., Q,
where the matricesW (w ij ) ∈ Ê N ×N , W (w ij ) ∈ Ê N ×N and W ( w ij ) ∈ Ê N ×N are formed by w ij , w ij and w ij defined in (93)-(95), respectively. Combining (92) and (97), we know that the statistic vectors evolve over time according tǒ
From (98), the statistic vectors at time L ≥ 1 can also be equivalently expressed aš
Note that (99) resembles the consensus algorithm in the fixed-sample-size test where there is no innovation, i.e.,γ (l) = γ (l) = γ (l) = 0 for l is larger than some L. In that case, under certain regularity conditions onW, W and W, consensus can be reached in the sense that the elements inΓ (l) , Γ (l) or Γ (l) converge to the same values as l → ∞, respectively. In contrast, with the new samples constantly arriving in the running consensus algorithm described in (92)-(99), the elements inΓ (l) , Γ (l) or Γ (l) cannot respectively reach consensus as l → ∞. However, we will show later that even though consensus cannot be reached as l → ∞, we still can employΓ (l) , Γ (l) and Γ (l) to construct local estimators of λ M , λ N and λ S at each sensor with bounded estimation errors, respectively.
Before proceeding, we first impose the following condition on the weight matricesW, W and W.
Condition 1. For the weight matrix W ∈ {W, W, W}, it satisfies
where 1 is the all-one vector and σ i (W) denotes the i-th largest singular value of W.
The condition essentially regulates the elements in the matrix. If we further require that every element in the matrix is non-negative, then Condition 1 is equivalent to W being doubly stochastic.
Based on the statistic vectorsΓ (l) , Γ (l) and Γ (l) , for each j = 1, 2, ..., N , we consider the following estimators of the statistics λ M , λ N and λ S , respectivelŷ
where e j ∆ = [0, ..., 0, 1 the j-th element , 0, ..., 0] T . It is worth mentioning thatλ
S,j only employ the local statistics at the j-th sensor, and therefore, can be locally obtained at each sensor. Regarding the estimation performance ofλ
S,j , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any given K, M and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, we have
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
From the definitions of λ M , λ N and λ S in (87), we know that the computation of these statistics require an FC to collect all quantized data from all sensors. However, Lemma 1 illustrates that just by employing local communications between neighboring sensors, each sensor can individually produce some local estimators which approximate λ M , λ N and λ S very well, since the estimation errors can be bounded from above. Moreover, since 0 < σ 2 (W), σ 2 (W), σ 2 ( W) < 1, the upper bounds on the estimation errors decrease to 0 as Q grows to infinity, which implies that these local estimatesλ
S,j can be sufficiently accurate for every j provided that Q is sufficiently large. S,j , we define the local estimators of η (1) K,M and η (2) K,M at the j-th sensor asη
C. Distributed Computation of η
respectively, wherê
Regarding the asymptotic performance of the estimatorsη
K,M,j , we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 4. In the asymptotic regime where M → ∞, for any given K < ∞ and any sensor j, we have
Proof: From (85) and (105), we can obtain
Regarding the first term in (110), we have
Similarly, the second term in (110) can be bounded from above as per
From (99) and the definition ofλ
M,j in (101), we know that
The inequality in (113) 
We first consider the term |Ĝ (j,1)
K,M | in (118). It is clear that
.
Noting that 1 − 1/x ≤ ln x ≤ x − 1 and by employing Lemma 1, we can obtain
where the quantity A (1,1)
K,M is defined as
Similarly, the second term in (119) can be bounded from above as per
where A (1, 2) K,M is defined as
by employing (119) and (120).
Note that
Furthermore, by employing (124), (127) and (128), we have
By following a similar approach as above, we can obtain
Moreover, we also have
Therefore, from (118), (129), (130), (131) and (132), we can obtain
which completes the proof for (108).
Next, we prove (109). Similar to (110), (111) and (112), we can obtain
by employing the definitions of η
K,M andη
K,M,j in (68) and (106), respectively.
Note that since σ 1 ( W) = 1, | γ (l) j | ≤ 1, and γ (l)
which yields Notably, the estimation performances ofη (1) K,M,j andη
K,M,j are different in the asymptotic regime where M → ∞. Theorem 4 demonstrates that as M → ∞, the estimation error ofη (2) K,M,j decreases to 0 with probability one, while the estimation error ofη (1) K,M,j only can be bounded above with probability one. This is mainly because, as shown by (105) and (106),η (1) K,M,j is scalable with respect to M whilê η (2) K,M,j is not. However, the estimation error ofη (1) K,M,j still can be controlled just by increasing the number of message-passing rounds Q in each sampling interval, i.e., as Q → ∞, the upper bounds in ji which implies that all the attacked sensors are stricken at the same time, i.e., they share the same estimate of the attack time. This underlying assumption inhibits the distributed computation of max 1≤k≤K K i=k j∈A φ (4) ji , since estimating the attack time (the maximization operation over k) requires all sensor data up to time K can be processed at a single place.
To this end, we relax the constraint of simultaneous attack and assume that the attack times at different sensors are different. In consequence, we modify the term max 1≤k≤K K i=k j∈A φ (4) ji by allowing each sensor to search its own attack time, that is max 1≤k≤K η (4)
(138)
It is worth mentioning that in the case where adversaries cannot perfectly synchronously launch attacks at sensors (e.g., attack times at different sensors can be distinct), searching the attack time at each individual sensor is expected to be more reasonable and effective. Moreover, this idea of allowing each sensor to search its own attack time is widely employed in the quickest detection in sensor networks, see [31] , [32] , [42] for instance.
The quantity ψ (K) j in (138) can be recursively expressed as
E. Distributed Approximate Generalized CUSUM
Based on (105), (106) and (150), we define the local test statistic at the j-th sensor as follows
Consequently, the distributed approximate generalized CUSUM (DAG-CUSUM) test at the j-th sensor can be written as
the DAG-CUSUM can be implemented in a distributed way. Therefore, the long-distance communication overheads can be spared when employing the DAG-CUSUM. We summarize the procedure for computing the DAG-CUSUM at one sensor in Algorithm 1. 
N ,j to evaluateη
K,M,j as in (105) and (106), respectively; 19 :
N ,j to evaluate ξ (K) as in (149); 20: Using ξ (K) to evaluateη In this section, we examine the performance of the DAG-CUSUM in (152) and compare it to that of GCUSUM in (8) .
A. Choice ofW, W and W First, we specify the weight matricesW, W and W in (98). There are multiple methods to choose W such that Condition 1 can be satisfied, one of which is assigning equal weights to the data from neighbors [43] . Here, we employ a similar idea as that in [43] and chooseW = W = W In specific, the weight matrix W admits
where A is the adjacent matrix, whose entries a ij = 1 if and only if i, j ∈ E and the matrix D diag{|N 1 |, |N 2 |, ..., |N K |} is called degree matrix. Their difference is called Laplacian matrix which is positive semidefinite. It can be shown that W in (155) satisfies Condition 1 [43] . Consider a sensor network consisting of 12 sensors which is depicted in Fig. 1 . The blue circles represent secure sensors and the red ones are insecure. The edges of the graph are represented by the dash lines. The weight matrix in (155) for the graph in Fig. 1 has σ 2 (W ) = 0.6511.
B. Simulation Setup
In the simulation, the unknown parameter θ = 1, the threshold of the quantizers is τ = 1, and the injected data µ j = 0.2 for all j. The noise n (k) j in (1) obeys Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance for all j and k. Moreover, the lower bound b on the injected data in (4) is 0.18, the attack time t a is set to 10. In addition, for the DAG-CUSUM, Q = 10, the parameter α = 0.975 and M = 2 × 10 5 . In Fig. 2 , we compare the proposed DAG-CUSUM in (152) with the centralized GCUSUM in (8) in terms of the average detection delay as the false alarm period increases. The number of Monte Carlo runs is 2000. Fig. 2 illustrates that when the DAG-CUSUM is employed, for any given false alarm period, the average detection delay of each sensor is very close to that of other sensors, which implies that the sensors, no matter attacked or unattacked, can detect the occurrence of attacks almost simultaneously.
It is worth mentioning that it takes way more time to obtain the curve for the centralized GCUSUM than the curves for the DAG-CUSUM. It is seen from Fig. 2 that by employing the DAG-CUSUM, we reduce the computational complexity and eliminate the global communication overheads at the price of some performance loss, since the performance of the centralized GCUSUM outperforms that of every sensor when the DAG-CUSUM is employed. This performance loss is possibly mainly induced by the relaxation in (138).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the generalized CUSUM algorithm for change detection in the presence of unknown parameters in both the pre-change and post-change models, in the context of quickest attack detection in a distributed parameter estimation system with one-bit quantized measurements. First, a sufficient condition is provided under which the expected false alarm period of the GCUSUM test can be guaranteed to be larger than any given value. Since the centralized GCUSUM incurs significant communication overhead, and moreover, has a prohibitively high computational complexity, we therefore focus on developing the distributed implementation of the GCUSUM. An alternative test statistic is first proposed as a substitute for that of GCUSUM which can be shown to be asymptotically equivalent. Then based on the proposed alternative test statistic and running consensus algorithms, we have proposed the DAG-CUSUM which significantly reduce the computational complexity and requires only local communications between neighboring sensors. The numerical results show that the proposed DAG-CUSUM algorithm can provide a performance that is comparable to the centralized GCUSUM.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We will just prove (102), and the proofs for (103) and (104) are similar.
By employing (89), (87) and (101), we can obtain
where the matrix J is defined as
From the definition of J in (157) and Condition 1, we havě W n − J = W − J n , ∀n = 1, 2, ...,
which can be proved by induction as follows:1) For n = 1, it is clear that (158) is true; 2) assume thať W n − J = W − J n for some n, then
where (159) is due to the fact that J 2 = J andWJ = JW n = J by employing (157) and Condition 1. 
where (160) is from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Noting that Ax 2 ≤ σ 1 (A) x 2 for any matrix W and vector x, and Condition 1 implies
from (161), we can obtain
where (163) is from the fact that |γ (l) j | ≤ 1 for all j and l. This completes the proof.
